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NOTES

POPULAR DISENCHANTMENT WITH OUR CURRENT
TORT SYSTEM-REFORMING PUNITIVE DAMAGES IN
OHIO*
Justice-to live honorably, not injure anyone and to render each
person his due.**
I.

INTRODUCTION

In response to the current tort crisis, 1 Ohio has enacted what is
commonly referred to as House Bill No. 1 (H.B. 1),2 a collection of
* The author would like to extend her appreciation to Professor Harry S. Gerla for the time
and effort he spent in reviewing the drafts of this article.
** Speech by Professor Thomas Lambert, University of Dayton School of Law, Scholar in
Residence, during the University of Dayton colloquium-Tort Reform: A Cry For Statutory Response (April 7, 1987).
I. According to one commentator, the "tort crisis" has resulted from "too much tort liability[,] too many claims, the extension of liability rules to new situations, the relaxation of the
requirement of fault, loose notions of causation, the erosion of defenses, and the inflation of damage awards." Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 443, 444-45
(1987). See generally Cortese & Riemer, Defining the Agenda for Serious Tort Reform, 24 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 903 (1987) (recognizing that the current tort system is in need of reform); Priest,
Puzzles of the Tort Crisis, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 497 (1987) (defining the tort crisis as an insurance
crisis); Sugarman, Doing Away With Tort Law, 73 CALIF. L. REV. 555 (1985) [hereinafter Doing
Away With Tort Law] (arguing that fundamental tort reform involves the uncoupling of compensation from deterrence); Sugarman, Serious Tort Law Reform, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 795 (1987)
(expressing the need for "serious reform" in the tort system); Note, A Tale of Two Theories-Is
the Legal System Responsible For The Insurance Crisis?, 14 J. LEGIS. 179 (1987) (allocating
responsibility for the insurance crisis). But see UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE,
REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS, PROFITABILITY OF THE MEDICAL MALPRACTICE (July
13, 1987) (report number: GAO/GGD-87-67). This report, which estimated the profitability of
the property/casualty insurance industry and concentrated on the medical malpractice and general liability insurance lines, revealed that although the property/casualty insurance industry incurred substantial underwriting losses over a ten year period (1976-85), the industry has more
than offset those aggregate losses with investment gains. Moreover, the report indicates that such
underwriting losses resulted, in part, from the industry's own cash-flow underwriting strategy. Id.
2. Am. Sub. H.B. 1, 117th Gen. Assembly, 1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-801 (Baldwin) (as
codified in various sections of the OHIO REV.CODE ANN. (Anderson Supp. 1988)) (effective date,
Jan. 5, 1988). House Speaker Vern Rifle describes H.B. I as a series of reforms involving both
substance and procedure. The thrust of H.B. 1 is to place extensive restraints on the state's insurance industry and to impose legislative reforms upon the state's civil justice system. Rifle, Foreword to S. DARLING, OHIO CIVIL JUSTICE REFORM ACT at v (1987).
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sophisticated legislative provisions aimed at comprehensive tort reform.' Included among these measures are rules governing punitive
damages in Ohio. Specifically, the new provisions modify prior punitive
damage law by: (1) codifying the existing case law' and developing
new evidentiary standards; 5 (2) requiring a higher standard of proof;'
(3) requiring that the court, rather than the jury, determine the award
amount;7 and (4) prohibiting automobile or motor vehicle liability policies that insure against punitive damage awards. 8
This note examines portions of Ohio's legislative attempt at tort
reform by analyzing the H.B. 1 provisions that relate to punitive damages.9 The first portion of this inquiry focuses on arguments which support the key functions of punitive damages. In contrast, the second portion discusses the criticisms surrounding punitive damage awards. To
this end, the discussion considers some of the constitutional challenges
sparked by punitive damages tort reform. The third portion of this note
describes the various approaches that states have utilized to govern punitive damages. The core of the analysis highlights the restraints placed
on tort law by contrasting prior Ohio law with the current legislative
modifications. Finally, this note concludes with a discussion explaining
the effect of these statutory changes on punitive damages litigation in
Ohio, thereby determining whether Ohio's punitive damages tort reform has achieved its intended goals.
II. BACKGROUND
A.

Defining Punitive Damages

Punitive damages are damages above and beyond actual losses to
the plaintiff. 10 Most states have adopted punitive damages pursuant to

3. Fletcher, Tortious Conduct, OHIO LAW., Jan.-Feb. 1988, at 10.
4. OIo REV. CODE ANN, § 2315.21(B) (eliminating the awarding of punitive damages
under the common law); see infra notes 142-43 and accompanying text.
5. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B)(l)-(2) (plaintiff must demonstrate that defendant's
actions or omissions involved malice, aggravated or egregious fraud, oppression, or insult and
plaintiff must prove actual damages resulting from defendant's actions or omissions). For a discussion of the pre-existing common law grounds see infra notes 115-27 and accompanying text.
6. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.80(B), 2315.21(C)(3) (plaintiff's burden of proof would
be by clear and convincing evidence); see infra note 131 and accompanying text.
7. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(C)(1)-(2); see infra note 132 and accompanying text.
8. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.182(A) (punitive damages are not insurable); see infra
note 134 and accompanying text.
9. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.18, 2315.21(B), (C)(I)-(3), (D), 3937.01-17, 3937.18,
3937.182(A); see infra notes 126-72 and accompanying text.
10.
W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW
OF TORTS § 2, at 9-10 (5th ed. 1984); see also AMERICAN TORT REFORM ASSOCIATION, LEGISLATIVE RESOURCE BOOK FOR TORT REFORM E-3 (1986) [hereinafter RESOURCE BOOK].
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/13
In Ohio, punitive damages are not available as of right, but are founded in public policy. See,
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common law doctrine.11 Typically, juries determine whether punitive
damages should be awarded and also set the award amount. 2 One author has broadly defined punitive damages to include "any penalty, in
money or property, exacted from the defendant by a civil judgment

primarily to deter him or others from engaging in similar conduct or to
punish him for engaging in such activity." 13 Although punitive damages may be defined in a general sense, their historical origins have
been the source of considerable controversy.
B. Historical Perspectives: The Evolution from Early Common Law
Concepts to Current Rationales
Two dominant theories influenced the development of punitive
damages in the early common law system. 4 One theory asserted that
the concept of punitive damages was developed by the courts to justify
judicial reluctance to disturb jury verdicts awarding excessive damages. 5 The other theory postulated that punitive damages were created

to "compensate the plaintiff for otherwise uncompensable injuries."1 "
At this juncture, however, it should be noted that these "historical justifications for the development of punitive damages" reflect the outdated early common law approach and are not representative of current

rationales. 1

7

As the concept of actual damages continued to evolve, courts began to recognize intangible harm as compensable.' 8 Thus, "the original
compensatory function of punitive damages came to be satisfied by actual damages, and the vast majority of modern courts and legislatures"
e.g.. Atlantic & G. W. Ry. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St. 162, 167 (1869) (holding that policy reasons
behind punitive damages were to punish the wrongdoer and to hold him out as an example to
deter others); Roberts v. Mason, 10 Ohio St. 278, 279 (1859) (holding that punitive damages are
allowable in torts involving fraud, malice, or insult).
11. Note, Tuttle v. Raymond: An Excessive Restriction Upon Punitive Damages Awards In
Motor Vehicle Tort Cases Involving Reckless Conduct, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 551, 554-55 (1987).
12. Trebilcock, The Social Insurance-Deterrence Dilemma of Modern North American
Tort Law: A CanadianPerspective of the Liability Insurance Crisis, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 929,
967 (1987).
13. Wheeler, The ConstitutionalCasefor Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures,69 VA.
L. REV. 269, 273 (1983) (citing CAL. CIv. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1982)); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 908(1) & comment a (1977).
14. Mallor & Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31 HASTINGS
L.J. 639, 642 (1980).
15. Id. at 643 n.25; see also Sales & Cole, Punitive Damages: A Relic That has Outlived
its Origins, 34 DEF. L.J. 429, 431 (1985). Early English courts "upheld jury verdicts that exceeded
the plaintiff's actual physical harm." K. REDDEN, PUNITIVE DAMAGES § 2.2(A)(1) (1980).
16. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 643. Uncompensable injuries, at early common
law, included intangible injuries such as emotional harm, pain, and suffering. Id.; see also Sales &
Cole, supra note 15, at 432.
17. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 461.
Published
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began to justify punitive damages primarily in terms of punishment
and deterrence.1 9 Accordingly, against this background, the doctrine of
punitive damages has maintained credibility for its existence.
C.

The Goals of Punitive Damages: Supporting Policy Arguments

Supporters of punitive damages recognize that such damages serve
the following public policies: (1) expressing society's view on outrageous conduct by punishing wrongdoers; (2) deterring others from reprehensible conduct; (3) compensating the plaintiff for elements of personal harm; and (4) satisfying pragmatic policy considerations by
encouraging small claims and by providing an incentive for civil action
where the criminal system's resources are limited.2 0 The following dis-

cussion explains these justifications 21 for imposing punitive damages,
and in so doing, illustrates an underlying philosophical/pragmatic

distinction.
1. The Dual Function of Punishment and Deterrence
Traditionally, jurisdictions that allow punitive damages posit that
they serve a dual function-to deter and punish2 2 persons who have
acted intentionally and deliberately to injure the plaintiff. 23 Under
these circumstances, punitive damages are imposed because they function to express society's view towards outrageous conduct .2 For these

19. Note, supra note 11, at 554.
20. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 647-50.
21. Professor Ellis has offered seven justifications for punitive damages: "(1) punishing the
defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; (3) deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5) inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the plaintiff's attorneys' fees."
Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 437 n.49; see also Ellis, Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of
Punitive Damages, 56 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1982).
22. Professors Mallor and Roberts maintain that it is illogical to separate punishment from
deterrence. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 648. They believe that "[i]nflicting punishment
for past acts . . .tends also to control future behavior, in that the defendant and others in a
similar position will wish to avoid the unpleasant consequences of such acts in the future." Id. In
contrast, Sales and Cole report that "[d]eterrence represents the singular basis for authorizing
punitive damages in Alaska, Georgia, Idaho, Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island and Utah." Sales &
Cole, supra note 15, at 439.
23. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 429; see also Bragg, Punitive Damages: An Insurer's
Lament, 34 DEF. L.J. 483, 483 (1985). See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, supra
note 13, § 908.
24. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 38-92 (1985). The historical origins of punitive or exemplary
damages have roots deep in the common law. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 431 n.10. For
general historical development, see Duffy, Punitive Damages: A Doctrine Which Should be Abolished, in PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: THE CASE AGAINST PUNITIVE DAMAGES 4-14 (Defense Research Institute Publication, 1969); Ellis, supra note 21, at 1-10; Owen, Punitive Damages in
Products Liability Litigation, 74 MICH. L. REV. 1258, 1262-68 (1976); Sales & Cole, supra note
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/13
15, at 432; Note, Status and Trends in State Product Liability Law: Punitive Damages, 14 J.
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reasons, one author has noted that the doctrine of punitive damages
can be a valuable device for "enhanc[ing] the civil law's admonition 5
to wrongdoers." 2 6 Therefore, the imposition of punitive damages as

punishment for past acts also serves to "control future behavior, in that
the defendant and others in a similar position will wish to avoid the
'
unpleasant consequences of such acts in the future."27
Furthermore, the doctrine's policy goal of deterrence also governs
manufacturers' conduct. For example, supporters of punitive damages
believe that they "[p]revent[] manufacturers from treating damages as
a cost of doing business .
1 Finally, Mallor and Roberts have
pointed out that "[t]his deterrent effect aids a civil court in enforcing
social norms, and consequently is especially vital where the defendant
would have little else to lose by committing the wrong."29
"...

2. Compensation
Punitive damages have also been justified as providing a mechanism for compensation.3" The viability of this rationale can be traced
back to early common law. 31 The few jurisdictions that continue to recognize the compensatory nature of punitive damages3 2 view them as

providing "renumeration for intangible injuries such as hurt feelings,
LEGIs. 249 (1987); Note, supra note 11, at 554. Some historians have suggesied that the early

concept of punitive damages reflected the philosophy that the civil forum should be utilized "as a
punitive agency in order to better balance punishment in the criminal forum where punishment
for minor offenses against the person was not severe in comparison to the punishment meted out
for minor offenses against property." M. Tomkies of Jones, Day, Reavis and Pogue, Columbus,
Ohio, Bifurcation of Decision-Making in the Award of Punitive Damages (October 20, 1986)
(legal memorandum) (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review); see Freifield, The Rationale of Punitive Damages, I OHIO ST. L.J. 5, 9 (1935).
25. Professor Morris defines the term "admonitory" to mean discouraging repetition of
wrongful conduct and warning others who are inclined to engage in similar conduct. Mallor &
Roberts, supra note 14, at 647 (citing Morris, Punitive Damages in Tort Cases, 44 HARV. L. REV.
1173, 1174 (1931)).
26. Id.
27. Id. at 648. It has been noted that courts have been unclear "in defining and identifying
the entities sought to be deterred by the effects of punitive damages." Sales & Cole, supra note
15, at 438. For example, some jurisdictions "intend to deter persons other than the defendant
from committing acts similar to those that prompted the punitive damage award," while others
intend "to deter both the defendant and other potential wrongdoers." Id. Two jurisdictions intend
to deter only the tortfeasor. Id.
28. Note, supra note 24, at 251.
29. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 648. The authors note that "[wihen the possibility
of a punitive damage award of an uncertain amount enters a defendant's decisionmaking process,
the financial temptation to engage in wrongful conduct becomes more resistible." Id. at 649.
30. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 429-40 (tracing the origins and theories of the use of
punitive damages).
31. Id. at 430.
32. These jurisdictions are reported to be Michigan, Connecticut, and New Hampshire. Id.
Published
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loss of companionship, wounded dignity, grief, embarrassment, mental
anguish, or litigation expenses.""3
3. Other Pragmatic Policy Considerations:
Bringing Successful Litigation

The Practicalities of

In some instances, the wrong committed does not "fit conveniently
into the framework of a recognized tort."- 4 These particular situations
require a court to determine whether some public policy "would be
served by the imposition of punitive damages. 3 5 Such judicial action is
commonly referred to as a public policy approach.
One author has suggested that application of the punitive damages
doctrine in this manner may "indirectly encourage settlement" and
may also serve "as a cost-spreading device."3 " Some authorities report
that punitive damages have been defended as
a partial remedy for the defect in American civil procedure which denies
compensation for actual expenses of litigation, such as counsel fees and
as an incentive to bring into court and redress a long array of petty cases
of outrage and oppression . ..which a private individual would other-

wise find not worth the trouble and expense of a lawsuit."
Others, including Professors Mallor and Roberts, also believe that punitive damages encourage plaintiffs to bring actions where actual damages are minimal.3 8 They emphasize that "[a]bsent the possibility of
obtaining punitive damages, it would be economically unfeasible in
such cases for a plaintiff to bring a lawsuit and unlikely that39the defendant would be deterred from similar action in the future."

33. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 440.
34. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 661 (quoting Vernon Fire & Cas. Ins. Co. v.
Sharp, 264 Ind. 599, 608, 349 N.E.2d 173, 180 (1976)). Classifying the bad faith breach of
contract as a tort is one example of modern courts utilizing a public policy approach in order to
allow the imposition of punitive damages. Id. at 661-63. In fact, many states allow punitive damages in contract cases involving malicious, oppressive or like conduct. Id. at 660-61. "Several
writers have suggested that . . . [this] trend . . . [represents an] effort[] to protect vulnerable
parties against abuse of bargaining power by dominant parties." Id. at 662.
35. Id. at 661.
36. Note, supra note 24, at 251.
37. W. KEETON, D. DoBBs, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 10, at 12.
38. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 649-50. With regard to compensating plaintiffs for
litigation expenses, one author has stated that "[wihere only small compensatory damages are
appropriate, punitive damages act as an incentive (or reward) to bring a suit where otherwise it
would not financially be worthwhile; thus [keeping] a check on manufacturers' conduct." Note,
supra note 24, at 250 n.16.
39. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 650. One writer suggests that the incentive to
bring small claims of actual damages, which are occasioned by outrageous conduct, "keeps a
check on manufacturers' conduct. Part of this incentive is that plaintiffs can cover their attorneys'
fees (that part of the recovery that is paid as part of the contingency fee system-allowing the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/13
plaintiff to receive a full compensatory award) and other litigation expenses." Note, supra note
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The conclusion to be drawn from the foregoing discussion of the
rationales for imposing punitive damages is that they function to promote retributive and utilitarian goals. However, the difficulty of putting
these theoretical goals into practice has drawn sharp criticism from
commentators attacking the doctrine's foibles. Accordingly, the next
section depicts the flawed nature of the .punitive damages doctrine by
presenting the arguments against such awards. These arguments re-.
present a distinction between criticisms that go to the heart of punitive
damages and those that call for the reform of punitive damages.
D. Arguments Against Punitive Damage Awards: Abolition or Reform?
1. A Call for Abolition of the Doctrine
As previously noted, punitive damages have been severely criticized throughout their history.' Such criticism has often been used to
justify the reappraisal and reform of punitive damages. The following
is a review of the major objections posed by critics who advocate the
complete abolition of the punitive damages doctrine. 1
a.

Punishment and Deterrence Are No Longer Viable Rationales

Some critics argue that the doctrine of punitive damages should be
abolished because it "wrongfully attempts to have the civil law, without
appropriate procedure safeguards,' 2 accomplish the purpose of the
criminal laws." 43 These critics contend that punishment "is the purpose
of the criminal system, whereas the purpose of the civil system is to
compensate the injured.""'

24, at 250 n.16. See generally W. KEETON, D. DOBBS. R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 10, at
14. Another author has adequately described the "efficacy of punitive damages as an incentive to
the plaintiff to bring a lawsuit and thereby vindicate society's outrage at the defendant's conduct,
which might otherwise go unpunished." Note, supra note 11, at 555-56.
40. W. KEETON, D. DOBBS, R. KEETON & D. OWEN, supra note 10, at 11.
41. See, e.g., Note, supra note 11, at 555. One commentator found that only five states
prohibited punitive damages: Nebraska, Massachusetts, Washington, Louisiana, and New Hampshire. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 435-36; see also Note, supra note 24, at 249 n.8.
42. Professor Wheeler argues that the criminal procedural protections of the fourth, fifth,
sixth, and fourteenth amendments should apply in punitive damages actions. Wheeler, supra note
13, at 272.
43. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 644. One writer has noted that the "[clurrent rules
governing punitive damages have been criticized, largely on the ground that they do not sufficiently reflect the quasi-criminal nature of such awards." Darling, Selected Tort and Civil Justice
Issues Before the 117th Ohio General Assembly, 48 OHIO ST. L.J. 365, 371 (1987). Another
writer notes that "the award of punitive damages has been called quasi-criminal punishment and,
thus, deserving of the protections applied in criminal cases." Note, supra note 24, at 255.
44. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 644. In contrast, proponents of punitive damages,
who approve
of the blend between
and criminal law, maintain that punitive damages
Published
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Diminished Viability of the Compensation Rationale

b.

Another frequently stated objection to punitive damages is that
they "do not serve the compensatory purpose for which they were originally created.""6 This observation is based on the fact that in recent
years the spectrum of compensatory damages now grants plaintiffs relief for intangible harms."6 In essence, then, this argument reflects the
view that "[t]he doctrine [of punitive damages] is an anachronism...
[that] should be abolished.""'
In contrast, though, some jurisdictions still recognize punitive
damages as providing remuneration for intangible injuries.48 Punitive
damages in these jurisdictions serve as "monetary [awards] that complement compensatory damages."' 9 In pointing out the fallacy of this
rationale, Sales and Cole state that "[t]hese jurisdictions predicate
their philosophy on the outdated theorem that such injuries were not
compensable under early common law." 5 0
c.

Double Punishment/Multiple Damages Potential

Critics of the doctrine frequently contend that punitive damages
subject a defendant to multiple punishment. 5 Specifically, Professors
Mallor and Roberts note that "a defendant may face the possibility of

and the defendant is wealthy." Note, supra note 1I, at 557. Punitive damages in such cases
may provide greater deterrence than a fine, especially when the maximum fine is miniscule
compared to the wealth of the defendant . . . . Moreover, when the defendant's conduct is
rarely or never prosecuted, punitive damages may constitute the only effective regulation of
conduct. This is particularly true in cases involving libel and slander, trespass, and technical batteries.
Id. Instances such as these provide for the use of punitive damages as a substitute for the criminal
law. Id. One observer has noted that some advocacy groups have expressed the concern that,
because no effective criminal penalties exist in many cases of aggravated misconduct, the elimination or severe limitation of punitive damages would increase the likelihood that corporate manufacturing safety will be disregarded. See NATIONAL INSURANCE CONSUMER ORGANIZATION, FACT
SHEET ON INEFFICIENCIES IN THE LEGAL SYSTEM 2 (1986) (discussing the Ford Pinto gas tank.
and the Dalkon Shield IUD as examples of manufacturer cost/benefit analyses which resulted in
plaintiff injury) (on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
45. Note, supra note 11, at 555. Critics reason that because the plaintiff has unlimited
access to compensatory damages, full compensation is now possible. Id.; see also Sales & Cole,
supra note 15, at 474. Therefore, an award of punitive damages constitutes an unjustified windfall
to the plaintiff, penalizes innocent consumers or society, and "sap[s] the vitality of the economy
upon which society is totally dependent." Id. at 474; see also Note, supra note 11, at 555.
46. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 433; see also Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 645;
Note, supra note I1, at 555.
47. Duffy, supra note 24, at 8. However, other authors argue, in rebuttal, that "[s]o long as
a doctrine continues to serve a necessary policy goal, the fact that it has diverged from its original
function does not provide a basis for abolishing the doctrine." Id.
48. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 440.
49. Id.
50. Id.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/13
51. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 645; see also Note, supra note 24, at 254 n.42.
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punishment on three fronts: as an element of the compensatory remedy;
as punitive damages; and as a criminal sanction." 52 The closely related
double jeopardy argument embraces the notion that "expos[ing] defendants to both criminal and civil penalties for the same conduct contravenes the . . .fifth amendment prohibition of double jeopardy."5 3
Hence, the propriety of awarding punitive damages to a fully compensated plaintiff is often questioned." In that regard, "[o]pponents of
punitive damages call such awards a windfall to the plaintiff."55 For
example, products liability litigation represents one area where the potential for multiple damages exists, thereby drawing criticism. In such
litigation, "[miultiple awards present the problem of limited defend57
ants' funds from which current and potential plaintiffs may recover."
Finally, one author has remarked that "[m]anufacturers and commentators continue to argue that . . . multiple damage awards render punitive damages unconstitutional, although the argument has yet to
succeed." 58
d.

Economic Inefficiency

Punitive damages have also been assailed because they "lack standards governing the amount of punitive [damage] awards." 59 This flexibility imparts to the jury "essentially limitless discretion in awarding
punitive damages."' Under these circumstances there exists a danger
that inexperienced and ill-equipped juries will act irrationally and out
of passion, prejudice, partiality, or corruption,61 thereby failing to
"mete out punishment that will be in the best interests of society."6 2
For example, observers have maintained that "punitive damages have
been used improperly by juries to increase the funds awarded to the
plaintiff, even in situations where there is little or no evidence of wan-

52. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 645. Some authors suggest that although punitive
damages are duplicative in certain cases it "is not a persuasive reason for abandoning the doctrine
altogether." Id. at 646.
53. Note, supra note 11, at 558. One commentator has noted that the majority of courts
have rejected the double jeopardy argument. Id. In his opinion, the double jeopardy argument has
not been successful outside the Indiana courts. Id. at 559.
54. Note, supra note 24, at 255 n.46.
55. Id. at 255.
56. Id. at 253.
57. Id. at 253 n.30.
58. Id. at 254.
59. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 646.
60. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 464.
61. Id. at 466.
62. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 646. The dangers of underdeterrence and
overdeterrence are created by the current punitive damages system because juries lack proper
Published
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ton or malicious behavior on the part of the defendant." 63 Such situations have led observers to express grave concerns "over the possible
severe economic effects precipitated by huge punitive damage

awards." 6 ' Accordingly, some have even cautioned that "[tlhis trend is
creating a significant threat to the stability of our economy." '65 Thus,
critics have concluded that a meaningful punitive damages doctrine requires "precisely defined limitations[,] . . .imperative to forestall the
economically and doctrinally debilitating effects of this concept."6 6
Theoretically, punitive damages are also economically inefficient
when they serve to over-deter desirable behavior.67 In that regard, the
goal of deterrence may cause people to fear engaging in risky activities
because of the threat of punitive damage awards.6 8 Here, again, the
argument for abolition is fueled on the premise that punitive damages
are economically inefficient.
e.

Constitutional Pitfalls

Finally, opponents have attacked punitive damages on constitutional grounds.6 9 These challenges have been identified in a growing
body of academic commentary. 70 The constitutional questions most
commonly raised 71 pertain to challenges regarding violations of equal

63. RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 10, at E-4. In support of this position, ATRA has noted
that "[t]he judge possesses greater strengths and abilities to examine the total picture and assess
the amount of punitive damages which should be awarded to the plaintiff." Id. at E-5.
64. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 465. In the context of products liability litigation, one
writer has maintained that "[tihe combination of many punitive recoveries and large awards on
top of compensatory damages could exhaust the resources of less financially sound companies."
Note, supra note 24, at 252 n.25. Professor Sugarman has expressed his skepticism "about the
value of imposing punitive damages on enterprises when the result is that shareholders and not the
individual wrongdoers pay." Doing Away With Tort Law, supra note 1,at 659. Sugarman also
notes that "punitive damages won't touch many of society's worst actors-hardened
criminals-because of their insolvency." Id.
65. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 466.
66. Id. at 475.
67. Id. at 439 n.67.
68. Id.
69. See Schmidt, The Constitutionality of Punitive Damages: A Challengefor the Judiciary, FOR THE DEFENSE, Feb. 20, 1985, at 20, 21-22 (presenting an overview of the constitutional
challenges to punitive damages).
70. See, e.g., Jeffries, A Comment on the Constitutionality of Punitive Damages, 72 VA. L.
REV. 139 (1986) (asserting that punitive damages violate the eighth amendment's ban on excessive fines and the fundamental fairness required by due process of law); Prentice, Reforming Punitive Damages: The Judicial Bargaining Concept, 7 REV. OF LITIGATION 113, 138-47 (1988)
(discussion considering whether judicial bargaining is constitutionally acceptable); see also Vinson, Constitutional Stumbling Blocks to Legislative Tort Reform, 15 FLA. ST. U.L. REV. 31
(1987) (several states including Florida have used state constitutional provisions to block tort
reform efforts). See generally Wheeler, supra note 13.
71. See Vinson, supra note 70, at 46; Wheeler, supra note 13, at 272 (suggesting that the
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/13
protections of the fourth, fifth, and sixth amendments apply to defendants from whom punitive
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protection, 72 substantive due processs7 3 double jeopardy,7 4 vagueness 7 5
77
self-incrimination, 76 and proof beyond a reasonable doubt.
2.

The Road to Reform

While some legislatures are motivated by forces dictating the abolishment of punitive damages, others choose reform measures to remedy
the problems most commonly associated with the doctrine. The next
section serves as an overview and analysis of punitive damages from the
perspectives of model legislative solutions, individual state approaches,

damages are sought).
72. Equal protection arguments appear to arise in two contexts. First, there is the contention that a person's right to equal protection may be violated when the respective financial resources of the two defendants are disclosed to a jury that is assessing damages. Schmidt, supra
note 69, at 22. In these situations, the jury may award a higher punitive damage amount against
the more affluent defendant. Id. Second, other defendants have raised equal protection challenges
regarding decisions that do not allow punitive damages for wrongful death, while allowing such
recovery for personal injury and property damage. Id.
In a recent opinion, a federal district court determined that a Massachusetts law allowing
punitive damages in wrongful death cases and not in personal injury cases was constitutional
under the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment. Freeman v. World Airways, Inc.,
596 F. Supp. 841, 845 (D. Mass. 1984). Using the rational basis level of scrutiny, the court
concluded that the "state's interest in deterrence of wilful [sic] conduct is outweighed by the
possibility of excessive damages in cases where the injuries do not result in death." Id. Accordingly, the court held that denying punitive damages in personal injury cases was constitutional. Id.
In another federal decision, the plaintiffs maintained that a Pennsylvania statute which denied punitive damages to victims of motor vehicle accidents disadvantaged the class of victims of
such accidents without a rational basis, thereby violating the equal protection and due process
clauses of the United States Constitution. Mele v. Nutmeg Bakers Supply, 580 F. Supp. 887, 889
(E.D. Pa. 1984). The court determined that no constitutional violation existed because there is no
constitutionally established fundamental right to recover punitive damages in tort actions. Id.
Moreover, the court advanced a rational basis argument and stated that the legislature had a
reasonable basis for such classification. Id. The court reasoned that the legislature's goal of "ensuring, through a uniform system of recovery, prompt payment of adequate basis loss benefits to
all persons injured in motor vehicle accidents [was permissible]." Id. Thus, the court determined
that the legislature acted reasonably in selecting the abolition of punitive damages as a means for
achieving its goals. Id.
73. In another recent example of this constitutional struggle, one court held that a one
million dollar cap on medical malpractice awards violated the right to trial by jury and represented an unlawful interference in the judicial system. Boyd v. Bulala, 647 F. Supp. 781, 789
(W.D. Va. 1986). The basis for the constitutional challenge in Boyd was the violation of substantive due process rights. Id.
74. One constitutional scholar has reported that "the applicability of the double jeopardy
clause [of the fifth amendment] to civil penalty proceedings has been less clear." Wheeler, supra
note 13, at 326. The primary purpose of the double jeopardy clause is to prevent harassment of
the criminal defendant. It has been suggested by another author that "[i]f punitive damages are
deserving of constitutional safeguards, the second punishment or second trial may violate the
double jeopardy clause." Schmidt, supra note 69, at 21. The author notes, though, that "this
argument cannot be relied upon if a person's actions do not constitute a criminal violation." Id.
75. Schmidt, supra note 69, at 21.
76. Id.
Published
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and state constitutional conflicts.
a.

Model Legislative Solutions

Although many commentators are opposed to punitive damages as
they presently exist and are critical of the method by which they are
assessed, not all of these commentators favor a total abolition of punitive damages. Instead of abolishing such damages, these commentators
favor changing the way in which punitive damages are now awarded.
For example, some noted scholars have enumerated the following series
of recommended state reform guidelines, which suggest a variety of devices for limiting the negative consequences of punitive damage
awards."
First, in response to criticisms that "[r]ealistic and meaningful
standards [governing punitive damage awards] presently are nonexistent," 7 9 it has been recommended that standards of conduct and proof
be developed to aid the fact finder in determining punitive damage liability.80 Second, because punitive damages reflect criminal law concepts
with sanctions that may have a stigmatizing effect on defendants,"
commentators have suggested that plaintiffs should be required to meet
the burden of a heightened standard of proof.8" Requiring a more stringent standard "ensure[s] that only the guilty are stigmatized ....
[and is] [o]ne means of preventing innocent persons or business entities
Third, in order to protect
from being unjustly punished ...
against juror bias, inexperience, and naivete84 current proposals have
recommended that judges, equipped with legal experience and experwhether punitive damages are awarded and, if
tise, should determine
85
so, in what amount.
The fourth remedy requires placing specific limits on punitive
damages award.8 This measure would minimize the potential for puni-

78. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 475-80; see also Doing Away With Tort Law, supra
note 1, at 660.
79. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 475.
80. Id. at 475 n.224.
81. Id. at 476-77; see also Ausness, supra note 24, at 110.
82. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 476 n.226. Professor Owen has recommended that a
clear and convincing standard or a beyond a reasonable doubt standard should be adopted. Owen,
Civil Punishment and the Public Good, 56 CAL. L. REV. 103, 118-19 (1982).
83. Ausness, supra note 24, at I10.
84. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 477.
85. Id.
86. Id. The authors suggest that limiting punitive damages "would curtail the current destructive abuses of the doctrine and would eliminate the current inordinate number of outrageous
awards." Id. at 477-78. Another writer has noted that the most popular and "direct method of
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/13
limiting punitive damages is to impose a statutory cap." Note, supra note 24, at 259.
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tive damages that would constitute a windfall to plaintiffs. 87 Moreover,
"[s]uch limitations would [also] curtail the current destructive abuses
of the doctrine and would eliminate the current inordinate number of
outrageous awards." 88 Fifth, in order to prevent "unnecessary and inequitable windfalls to plaintiffs[,]" 8 9 some commentators have endorsed
the idea that any punitive damages awarded and "recovered . . . be
payable to . . . state treasuries just like any other penal fines." 90 Sixth,
to avoid contravening "public policy . . . [and] penaliz[ing] innocent
purchasers of insurance who suffer increased premiums each time a
court concludes that liability insurance provides coverage for [punitive
damage awards]," 9 1 reformers have suggested that insurance coverage
should not be permitted for punitive damages. 92 Finally, in response to
the attack on appellate courts for their "abdication of appellate review
responsibility" by a long history of "summarily characteriz[ing] the
amount of punitive damage awards as a fact issue for jury determination[,]" 9 critics have suggested that appellate courts be more aggressive in scrutinizing exemplary awards. 9'
The previous discussion, while highlighting the most frequently
stated objections to the punitive damages doctrine, also presented some
popular remedial suggestions. In one sense, this unrest reflects the continuing policy debate regarding the propriety of punitive damages in
the United States. 9 5 As the discussion continues, its focus shifts to an
examination of the statutory modifications made by several states to
existing punitive damages laws.9
b.

State Approaches

In actuality, states have looked to a variety of approaches in an
attempt to govern punitive damages, leaving the doctrine notably unsettled in today's tort environment. 97 In addition to judicial attempts, 98

87. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 477-78, 480; see also Note, supra note 24, at 260.
88. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 477-78.
89. Id. at 479.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 480.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. See Note, supra note 24, at 256-60.
96. See Darling, supra note 43, at 371 & n.61 (listing nine states that have changed their
punitive damages laws as of 1986).
97. See Note, supra note 11, at 560. According to one commentator, only Connecticut,
Georgia, Michigan, and New Hampshire expressly recognize the compensatory function of punitive damages as being of primary importance. Id. In fact, some observers have noted that in those
jurisdictions, the scope and application of the punitive damage doctrine has been so severely limPublished
1988
ited "that,byin eCommons,
[effect], punitive
damages have been reduced to nothing more than compensatory
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many states have turned to statutory law in an effort to provide measures that will promote an effective and efficient compensation system. 99 For example, while some states follow the common law limita-

tion that punitive damages "must bear a reasonable relation to'actual
damages," others have placed statutory ceilings on punitive damage
amounts. 00 That is, some states have created "caps" on punitive damThese states have curtailed punitive damage awards by "reages.'
stricting them, in most cases, to the amount of compensatory damages
awarded."1 02
Current standards governing the burden of proof for awarding punitive damages also vary.a°a This variation seems to flow from the current debate surrounding the issue of whether the burden of proof for
punitive damages is too low.' 04 Several states have imposed a heightened standard of proof.'0 5 It is interesting to note that culpability stan-

damages." See Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 436. Other commentators have discovered that
forty-six states and the District of Columbia allowed punitive damages at common law. See J.
GHIARDI & J. KIRCHER, PUNITIVE DAMAGES L. & PRAC. § 1.02, at table 4.1 (1985). However,
Louisiana, Massachusetts, Nebraska, and Washington constitute a minority of states that prohibit
the recovery of punitive damages pursuant to common law. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 435.
It is noteworthy that Louisiana and Massachusetts, "allow punitive damages only in the narrow
context of statutorily authorized situations." Id. at 435-36. Authorities have also pointed out that
at least Indiana, Nebraska, and Washington either "totally or partially proscribe the use of punitive damages in all civil cases." Id. at 436. Also, commentators note that statutes in Oregon and
Utah specifically state that deterrence is the only proper basis of punitive damages. Id. at 439
n.65. See generally J.GHIARDI & J.KIRCHER, supra, § 4.09-12 (1985 & Supp. 1986).
98. See supra notes 1, 10, 97 and infra notes 122, 155 and accompanying text. For a thorough commentary on punitive damages reforms which utilize the judicial bargaining concept, see
Prentice, supra note 70, at 113.
99. Note, supra note 11, at 560.
100. See Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 1385, 1405 (1987). Several states have placed caps on punitive damage awards.
See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(b)(3) (1987) (ordinarily less than or equal to actual
damages, but can be raised up to three times the actual damages); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52240(b) (West Supp. 1988) (cap of twice the actual damages); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(1) (West
Supp. 1989) (no greater than up to three times compensatory damages, but a greater award is
allowable if plaintiff proves punitive liability by clear and convincing evidence); MD.CTS. & JUD.
PROC. CODE ANN. § ll-108(a)(2), (b) (Supp. 1988) ($350,000 maximum for punitive damages
exclusive of noneconomic loss); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-38.1 (Supp. 1988) (maximum award limited to $350,000). See generally Owen, Deterrence and Desert in Tort: A Comment, 73 CALIF. L.
REV. 665, 672 (1985). One researcher notes that in some instances statutory limits may be lifted
where the judge finds, pursuant to clear and convincing evidence, that it is warranted. Johnston,
supra, at 1405 n.60; see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73(b); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (West
1987). These various provisions regulating the size of individual awards are designed to prevent
both "disproportionate punishment and overdeterrence." Ausness, supra note 24, at 113.
101. See sources cited supra note 100 and infra note 102.
102. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102 (Supp. 1987); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73;
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9.
103. See infra note 120 and accompanying text.
104. See Johnston, supra note 100, at 1404.
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/13
105. Johnston, supra note 100, at 1403 n.48. Although a majority of states apply the pre-
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dards governing the imposition of fault have also lacked uniformity.1"6
Finally, several states have attempted to govern punitive damage
awards by requiring that a portion of the award be paid to a special
state fund, to be used for public purposes.1" 7 In some states, plaintiffs
are required to meet threshold considerations before the issue of punitive damages is even considered.108 In sum, it would appear that the
aforementioned jurisdictions have followed a course of tort reform
which closely parallels the model guidelines discussed in the preceding
section.109
c.

Constitutional Attacks on State Reform Measures

In several instances, state tort reform efforts that affect punitive
damages have led to state constitutional struggles.' 1 0 In that regard,
state reform measures have sometimes been challenged on the basis
that such provisions violate the due process clause of a particular
state's constitution or that such measures involve "open courts infringe-

ponderance of evidence rule, an increasing number of jurisdictions have adopted the clear and
convincing standard either by judicial decision or by statute. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.17.020
(Supp. 1988); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-34-2 (West Supp.. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-3402
(West Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.20(1) (West 1988); MONT. CODE ANN. § 27-1221(5) (1987); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03.2.11 (Supp. 1987); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9; OR.
REV. STAT. § 30.925(l) (1987).
106. Some states have statutes codifying the requisite standard of conduct governing punitive damages. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3294 (West Supp. 1989) (oppression, fraud, or malice);
COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-102(1)(a) (fraud, malice, or willful and wanton); CONN. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 52-240b (reckless disregard); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987); MINN. STAT.
ANN. § 594.20 (willful indifference to the rights or safety of others); N.D. CENT. CODE § 32-03-07
(oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed); OKLA STAT. ANN. tit. 23, § 9 (wanton or
reckless disregard, or oppression, fraud, or malice, actual or presumed); OR. REV. STAT. § 30.925
(wanton disregard); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-3-2 (1987) (oppression, fraud, or malice,
actual or presumed).
107. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13.21-102(1)(a) to 102(4) (one-third to state general
fund); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.73 (60% of punitive damage award goes into medical assistance or
general revenue fund); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 110, para. 2-1207 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1988) (judge
has discretion to apportion part of the punitive damages award to the State Department of Rehabilitation Services); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (West 1987) (any amount in excess of 25% of a
punitive damages award must be paid into a civil reparations fund unless the action resulted from
a tort directed at the particular plaintiff).
108. In many states the plaintiff may not claim punitive damages unless the judge determines that there is a reasonable chance of recovering such damages. IDAHO CODE § 6-1604 (2)
(Supp. 1988); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. l10, para. 2-604.1; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 549.191; N.D. CENT.
CODE § 32-03.2-11; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 21-1-4.1; see also GA. CODE ANN. § 51-125.1(d)(1) (Supp. 1988) (trier of fact must return a preliminary finding that punitive damages
should be awarded before fixing the amount); IOWA CODE ANN. § 668A.1 (requiring jury to
answer special interrogatories before awarding punitive damages).
109. See supra notes 97-108 and accompanying text.
110. Tort Reform: Opponents PrepareState Court Challenges to Overturn Recent Laws,
ATLA Meeting Told, Prod. Safety and Liab. Rep. (BNA) 558 (July 31, 1987) [hereinafter Tort
Reform].
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For example, Professor Darling notes that the Ohio legisla-

tive provision mandating judicial assessment of the amount of the punitive damage award, may violate the right of a jury trial which is
guaranteed by article I, section 5 of the Ohio Constitution."1 2 Finally, a
representative of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America

(ATLA), reports that "state standards of review for 'tort reform' statutes are more liberal than those used by the federal courts." 3 Nonetheless, he also noted that state challenges under state constitutions
seek strict or heightened scrutiny of the statutes involved."1 4 At this
juncture, the focus of the article will shift to the development of the
punitive damages doctrine under Ohio law.
E.

Ohio Law: The Prior Rules Governing Punitive Damages

Initially, punitive damages were designated as an additional remedy to compensatory damages1 ' and Ohio law authorized such awards
pursuant to either statute 1 6 or common law." 7 However, prior to H.B.
1, the traditional standards which governed the imposition and assessment of punitive damages in Ohio "remained frustratingly vague." 11 8

11. Id.; see also Vinson, supra note 70, at 36.
112. Darling, supra note 43, at 371 n.63. H.B. I requires the court rather than the jury to
determine the amount of punitive damages in civil cases. Id.
113. Tort Reform, supra note 110, at 558. Mr. Palmer pointed out that "[s]tate courts also
have greater powers of judicial review that enable them to substitute their own evaluation of the
relationship between a group of potential plaintiffs affected by a statute and the ends sought by
that statute." Id.
114. Id.
115. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.21, 3937.18(1) (Anderson Supp. 1988); Legislative
Service Commission Analysis of Proposed Am. Sub. H.B. 1, 1987 Ohio Legis. Serv. 5-839, 5-851
(Baldwin) [hereinafter Analysis]; see also S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 114-22.
116. Professor Darling notes that in specific instances prior Ohio law authorized statutory
recovery of punitive damages. S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 116. Darling cites the following statutory authority as examples of such provisions:
RC 955.40 (exemplary damages for violation of a rabies quarantine order by a corporation); RC 2307.50 (punitive damages for child stealing crimes); RC 2307.61 (exemplary
damages for willful damage to property or commission of specified theft offense); RC
2307.70 (punitive damages for vandalism, desecration, or ethnic intimidation); RC 2919.12
(exemplary damages for unlawful abortion); RC 3721.17 (punitive damages for specified
violations of rights of nursing home residents).
S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 116.
117. See Gearhart v. Angeloff, 17 Ohio App. 2d 143, 144, 244 N.E.2d 802, 804 (1969)
(punitive damages may be awarded for a tort which involves intentional wrongdoing, or other
outrageous conduct). But see Rubeck v. Huffman, 54 Ohio St. 2d 20, 23, 374 N.E.2d 411, 413
(1978) (punitive damages are not available in wrongful death actions).
118. Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St. 3d 334, 335, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1175 (1987); see also
Darling, supra note 43, at 371. It is noteworthy that in the past "[t]he elements necessary to
entitle a plaintiff to an award of punitive damages in an action for money only [had to] be proved
by a preponderance of the evidence." Johnson v. Stackhouse, 27 Ohio St. 2d 140, 143, 271 N.E.2d
782, 784 (1971).
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For example, before tort reform found its way into the Ohio legislature," 9 the common law grounds recognized by the Ohio Supreme

Court for awarding punitive damages included malice,120 fraud, 21 or

oppression. 2 2 Recent opinions have e*xpanded the criteria to include inbad faith. 2 4 Some courts have
sult 1 23 and, in the case of an insurer,
drawn a distinction between malice 25 and actual malice.1 26 Recently,

119. Ohio recognized punitive damages as early as 1859 and has continued to do so
throughout its judicial history. See, e.g., Atlantic & G. W. Ry. v. Dunn, 19 Ohio St. 162, 170
(1869) (enunciated policy reasons for punitive damages as punishment and deterrence); Roberts v.
Mason, 10 Ohio St. 277, 283 (1859) (first case to allow punitive damages); W. Connelly, S.
Collier, & K. Joyce, Ohio Academy of Trial Lawyers Position Paper on Senate Bill 338 (1986)
(on file with the University of Dayton Law Review).
Punitive damages are founded in public policy, based on the theories of punishment and deterrence, and therefore, have a distinct identity from compensation. Saberton v. Greenwald, 146
Ohio St. 414-28, 66 N.E.2d 224, 229-30 (1946) ("Punitive damages [may be assessed] in certain
tort cases where the defendant's wrongdoing has been intentional and deliberate, or has the character of outrage frequently associated with crime"). The Ohio Supreme Court has stated that
punitive damages are "'deemed so firmly settled as to require alteration to come from the legislature rather than from the judiciary.' " Id. at 424, 66 N.E.2d at 229 (quoting 13 OHIo JUR. Damages § 137 (1930)); see also Roberts, 10 Ohio St. at 280.
120. Roberts, 10 Ohio St. 278, 280 (1859).
121. See, e.g., Preston, 32 Ohio St. 3d at 334, 512 N.E.2d at 1174; Carr v. Charter Nat'l
Life Ins. Co., 22 Ohio St. 3d 11, 13, 488 N.E.2d 199, 201 (1986) (punitive damages were not
recoverable because evidence did not indicate insurer was guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice in
refusing to pay a valid claim under a life insurance policy); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio
St. 3d 272, 277, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1321 (1983); Locafrance United States Corp. v. Interstate
Dist. Servs. Inc., 6 Ohio St. 3d 198, 202, 451 N.E.2d 1222, 1225 (1983); Delting v. Chockley, 70
Ohio St. 2d 134, 135, 436 N.E.2d 208, 209 (1982) (punitive damages in Ohio involve the ingredients of fraud, malice, or insult).
Several cases have required aggravated fraud. See, e.g., Charles R. Combs Trucking v. International Harvester Co., 12 Ohio St. 3d 241, 245, 466 N.E.2d 883, 888 (1984); Logsdon v. Graham Ford Co., 54 Ohio St. 2d 336, 340, 376 N.E.2d 1333, 1336 (1978).
122. Suver v. Personal Serv. Ins. Co., 11 Ohio St. 3d 6, 7, 462 N.E.2d 415, 417 (1984) (in
order to award punitive damages guilt of actual malice, fraud, or oppression must be demonstrated); see also Carr v. Charter Nat'l Life Ins. Co., 22 Ohio St. 3d 11, 13, 488 N.E.2d 199, 203
(1986); Hoskins v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 6 Ohio St. 3d 272, 277, 452 N.E.2d 1315, 1321 (1983).
123. Suver, II Ohio St. 3d at 7-8, 462 N.E.2d at 416-17; Delting v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St.
2d 134, 136, 436 N.E.2d 208, 210 (1982).
124. Hoskins, 6 Ohio St. 3d at 272, 452 N.E.2d at 1315 (insurer has the duty to act in
good faith in the handling and settlement of insurance claims and punitive damages may be recovered against an insurer who breaches this duty); see also Carr, 22 Ohio St. 3d at 13, 488 N.E.2d
at 201; Columbus Finance v. Howard, 42 Ohio St. 2d 178, 183-84, 327 N.E.2d 654, 658 (1975).
125. See, e.g., Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St. 3d 334, 336, 512 N.E.2d 1174, 1176 (1987)
(requires a showing of actual malice); Carr, 22 Ohio St. 3d at 13, 488 N.E.2d at 201; Davis v.
Tunison, 168 Ohio St. 471, 474, 155 N.E.2d 904, 907 (1959) (malice can reasonably be inferred
from conduct and surrounding circumstances); see also S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 116-17.
126. See, e.g., Suver, 11 Ohio St. 3d at 6-8, 462 N.E.2d at 416-18; Leichtamer v. American Motors Corp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 456, 471, 424 N.E.2d 568, 578 (1981); Columbus Finance, 42
Ohio St. 2d at 184, 327 N.E.2d at 658; Pickle v. Swinehart, 170 Ohio St. 441, 442, 166 N.E.2d
227, 229 (1960); Davis, 168 Ohio St. at 471, 155 N.E.2d at 904; Smithhisler v. Dutter, 157 Ohio
St. 454, 459, 105 N.E.2d 868, 871 (1952); see also S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 116-17.
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in Preston v. Murty, 27 the Ohio Supreme Court held that the actual
malice necessary for an award of punitive damages must be "(1) . . .
[behavior which is] characterized by hatred, ill will, or a spirit of revenge, or (2) . . . [extremely reckless behavior revealing] a conscious
disregard for the rights and safety of other persons that has a great
probability of causing substantial harm."'28
Furthermore, punitive damages were not awarded absent proof of
13
actual damages 29 that resulted from a defendant's acts or omissions, 1
in either tort actions against political subdivisions under the Political
Subdivision Sovereign Immunity Law,1 31 or in tort actions against the
state in the Court of Claims. 3 2 Moreover, under Ohio law the standard
of proof required for awarding punitive damages was by a preponderance of the evidence and the trier of fact determined both the defendant's liability and the amount of such damages.1 3 Additionally, punitive damages were not recoverable in wrongful death actions"3 and
uninsured and underinsured motorist coverages in automobile insurance
policies did not include the payment of punitive damages." 5
In sum, the Ohio decisions demonstrated that punitive damages in
Ohio were intended to "punish[] the offending party [thereby] setting
him up as an example to others that they might be deterred from similar conduct." 1 36 Although punitive damages in Ohio have existed as a

127. 32 Ohio St. 3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174 (1987).
128. Id. at 336, 512 N.E.2d at 1175. The Preston court noted that "before submitting the
issue of punitive damages to the jury, a trial court must . . . determine if reasonable minds can
differ as to whether the party was aware his or her act had a great probability of causing substantial harm . . . [and] must determine that sufficient evidence is presented revealing that the party
consciously disregarded the injured party's rights or safety." Id.
129. See Shimola v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 25 Ohio St. 3d 84, 86, 495 N.E.2d 391, 393-94
(1986) (vacated punitive damages award because proof of actual damages was absent); Seasons
Coal Co. v. City of Cleveland, 10 Ohio-t. 3d 77, 82, 461 N.E.2d 1273, 1278 (1984) ("punitive
damages are highly irregular absent proof of any actual damages"); Richard v. Hunter, 151 Ohio
St. 185, 188, 85 N.E.2d 109, 110 (1949) ("punitive damages are not recoverable in the absence of
proof of actual damages . . . because punitive damages are mere incidents to the cause of action"); Saberton v. Greenwald, 146 Ohio St. 414, 425-28, 66 N.E.2d 224, 229-230 (1946); Trainor v. Deters, 22 Ohio App. 2d 135, 139, 259 N.E.2d 131, 134-35 (1969); Schumacher v. Siefert,
35 Ohio App. 405, 406-07, 172 N.E. 420,-420 (1930).
130. S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 114-22. See generally Analysis, supra note 115, at 5841.
131. Analysis, supra note 115, at 5-841.
132. Id.
133. S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 114-22. See generally Analysis, supra note 115, at 5841.
134.. S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 118-22; see also OHIO REV. CODE § 2125.02(3)(D)
(Anderson Supp. 1988).
135. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3937.18(A)(1).
136. Delting v. Chockley, 70 Ohio St. 2d 134, 135, 436 N.E.2d 208, 209 (1982); see also
Analysis, supra note 115, at 5-841.
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common law concept, the state legislature apparently responded to the
induced hysteria of an insurance crisis 137 and enacted reform measures
aimed at redressing the imbalances in the punitive damages system.
F.

Modifications to Punitive Damages: Current Ohio Law

The Ohio legislature, disenchanted with punitive damages law and
responding to the problems perceived in the current system, enacted
new statutory punitive damages provisions in 1987.118 First, the statute
delineates evidentiary standards. 139 Specifically, the enactment codified
the common law standard generally required for recovery of punitive
damages. 14 0 Accordingly, the ability of courts to award such damages
" ' has been eliminated." 4 Second,
under the common law 14
to win insurance industry support for such legislative measures, the new provisions
increase the plaintiff's burden of required proof for a punitive damage
award from a preponderance of the evidence to clear and convincing
evidence.'1 3 Third, the role of the judge and jury has been changed.' 4 '
The new law provides that although the trier of fact may determine a
defendant's liability for punitive damages, the court must determine
the amount of such damages."15 Finally, the provision, which deemed
46
punitive damages to be uninsurable in motor vehicle liability policies,
was clarified and made unequivocal." 7

137. M. Smith, House Council: Challenging State Laws that Abridge Plaintiff's Rights,
ATLA Advoca., vol. 13, no. 6, Sept. 1987, p. 1.
138. Professor Darling reports that Ohio's original reform proposal would have accomplished the following:
(1) raised the plaintiff's quantum of proof from 'preponderance of the evidence' to 'beyond
a reasonable doubt,' (2) removed the power of a jury to determine the amount of any
punitive award, (3) set a cap on any punitive damages equal to the amount of compensatory damages recovered by the plaintiff, (4) required that tort 6laintiffls pay all punitive
damages recovered to the Treasurer of State for deposit in the general revenue fund, and
(5) imposed other limitations on punitive awards, including mandatory shifting of defense
attorney fees to plaintiffs who prosecute unsuccessful punitive damage claims.
S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 118.
139. OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.21(C)(3). This provision does not apply to 'tort actions
against the state in the court of claims or to the extent that another section of the revised code
"differs from one of the three major changes otherwise made by RC 2315.21." Id. §
2315.21(D)(1),(2); see also S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 119.
140. OHIO REV. CODE § 2315.21(B)(l)-(2).
141. The common law grounds for awarding punitive or exemplary damages prior to H.B. I
included malice, fraud, oppression, or insult. See sources cited supra notes 114-27.
142. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2315.18, 2315.21(C)(2).
143. Id. § 2315.21 (C)(3); see also Ohio: Governor Celeste Signs Measure Reforming Tort,
Insurance Laws, Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 743 (Oct. 16, 1987).
144. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(C)(2).
145. Id.
146. Id. § 3937.18(1).
147. Id. § 3937.182(A),(B),(C).
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ANALYSIS

Ohio's Response to Change

The new punitive damages provisions indicate that Ohio
lawmakers have rejected the abolitionist position and enthusiastically
embraced the notion of tort reform. Ohio's tort reform measures will
have a significant effect on the formulation and implementation of policies, rules, and regulations because such fundamental revisions represent the impact of social, political, and economic forces.1" 8 Even so,
what remains to be decided is whether Ohio's tort reform measures
really do answer the problems which reformers wished to address or
whether they merely create new problems of their own. The following
analysis examines the modifications made to Ohio law in order to ascertain the potential effects on those who must litigate punitive damages issues under these provisions. The provisions are then analyzed to
determine whether Ohio's new law effectively addresses the major criticisms149 surrounding punitive damages.
1. The Impact of H.B. 1 on the Litigation Setting
As previously mentioned, the implementation of Ohio's new punitive damages statute mandates changes that affect all players within
the litigation arena. The following discussion identifies and considers
the impact of the provisions on punitive damages from a litigant's
perspective.
a.

Court Determination of the Punitive Damages Award Amount

Requiring judges, rather than juries, to determine the amount of
punitive damages awards may actually be the most radical and controversial area of the H.B. l's punitive damages provisions. Taking the
determination of the punitive damages award away from the jury appears to hurt the plaintiff and benefit the defendant for the following

148.

"G.

STEINER

& J. MINER, MANAGEMENT POLICY AND STRATEGY TEXT, READINGS,

17-32 (1977). See generally HUSE, ORGANIZATION DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE
111-15 (1975).
149. See supra notes 1, 8, 23, 112, and 122-34 and accompanying text; see also Treyens,
Insurance Chief Points out Flaws in Reform Bill, Columbus Dispatch, April 3, 1987, at 3F; State
Senate Panel to Renew Study of Insurance, Liability Questions, Dayton Daily News and J. Herald, Feb. 26, 1987, at 21, col. 4; Ohio House Approves Revised Insurance Bill. Dayton Daily
News and J. Herald, Feb. 18, 1987, at 6, col. 1; Damage Awards are Said to Exceed Rate of
Inflation, Wall St. J., July 30, 1986, at 8, col. 5. See generally Berkowitz, How Serious is
Sugarman's "Serious Tort Law Reform?", 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 877 (1987); Cortese &
Riemer, supra note 1; Gray, On Sugarman on Tort-Chopping. 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 851 (1987);
Little, Up With Torts, 24 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 861 (1987); Snyder, Serious Tort Reform Isn't: A
Critique of Professor Sugarman's "Serious Tort Law Reform". 24 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 893
(1987).
AND CASES
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reasons. First, because judges are far more concerned about punitive
damage awards, they are far less likely to award punitive damages in
the first place. For example, juries are generally inexperienced in "distinguish[ing] behavior that justifies punishment"' 15 and may award punitive damages when they "smell" something they do not like even
though the defendant's behavior does not meet all the necessary requirements of the law. By way of illustration, it is easier for a jury to
find that "malice" exists because they are less familiar with the term
and have less experience with such legal concepts. Judges, on the other
hand, are less likely to find malice because, from a legal standpoint,
they know how difficult it is to prove.
Second, judges may be more utilitarian in their attitudes. They are
more familiar than juries with legal concepts1 5 and have "less rigid
preconceptions that might bias decisions." '52 Moreover, judges are
more sensitive to the worth or value of damages in jurisprudence and
therefore will not want to over-deter. Finally, judges are more insulated
than juries in determining society's outrage. 53 In sum, the reallocation
of power and realignment of duties appears to benefit defendants, because plaintiffs will have to work harder to establish the need for judgeawarded punitive damages.
b.

Higher Standards for the Burden of Proof

Raising the burden of proof that juries must use in weighing the
evidence, to the clear and convincing standard, also appears to benefit
defendants because plaintiffs must now carry a heavier burden. Because punitive damages reflect social outrage and represent concepts
closely akin to the criminal law, dictating a higher standard seems to
naturally follow. That is, the punishment aspect of punitive damages
and its comparison to criminal sanctions appear to justify a "standard
of proof between the civil standard [a mere preponderance] and the
criminal standard [beyond a reasonable doubt]. ' 54
From a pragmatic view, however, a higher standard of proof may
not make any difference to a jury because, in practice, they may simply

150. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 477.
151. Id.
152. Id. at 477 n.230.
153. Some commentators who are opposed to the reallocation of judicial power believe that
since one purpose of punitive damages is to express social outrage, a jury of layman is better able
to make such a determination because juries are thought to represent the common man while
judges represent the elite. Dean Prosser states that in doubtful cases questions should be sent to
the jury "because the public insists that its conduct be judged in part by the man in the street
rather than by lawyers, and the jury serves as a shock absorber to cushion the impact of the law."
W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 37 (4th ed. 1984).
supra note1988
24, at 258.
154.byNote,
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choose who they want to win using either standard. In fact, in some
cases, a jury may not fully understand or appreciate the differences
between such legal standards. Thus, practically speaking, changing the
standard of proof may not prevent punitive damage awards or make
them less frequent. Finally, it is noteworthy that requiring a more
stringent standard of proof is consistent with the deterrence/punishment purposes of punitive damages.
c.

Codification of the Pre-existing Common Law

The codification of the common law grounds for recovery of punitive damages maintains the status quo in Ohio because there are no
apparent differences between the common law and the codification.
Consequently, the codification process in Ohio neither defined anything
new nor removed any old ambiguities surrounding the concept of punitive damages.
Although the codification appears to cut equally for plaintiffs and
defendants alike, it may help plaintiffs of the future because the trend
in law appears to be pro-defendant. It can be argued that by freezing
in time what is required to recover punitive damages, the codification
process may have served to protect future plaintiffs against pro-defendant changes vis-a-vis the common law.' 55
d.

Prohibition Against Motor Vehicle Liability Insurance for
Payment of Punitive Damage Awards

A majority of jurisdictions have permitted liability insurance to
cover punitive damage awards.15 Ohio, however, has strengthened its
former position by prohibiting motor vehicle liability insurance coverage for punitive damages. 57 By not allowing indemnification of defendants for their wrongful acts, Ohio's legislative provision reinforces the
original punishment and deterrence rationales of punitive damages.' 5 8
Indeed, the uninsurability of punitive damages with regard to motor
vehicle liability is indicative of the "General Assembly's public policy
pronouncement that punitive damages are designed to be a deterrent to
outrageous conduct and permitting one to insure against such awards

155. In the future, the common law may evolve to a point where it becomes more prodefendant with regard to tort law. Thus, through the process of codification, Ohio's punitive damages law is frozen in time, thereby protecting plaintiffs against the possibility of having to carry a
heavier burden than that which is presently required.
156. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 472-73 nn.209-13.
157. Courts that prohibit insurance coverage for punitive damages "on public policy
grounds recognize that insurance negates the objectives purportedly served by punitive damages."
Id. at 472.
158. Allowing punitive damages insurance contravenes public policy since it defeats the notion that punitive damages are supposed to "hurt" the wrongdoer. Id. at 473.
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would contradict that objective."' 59 Overall, the full effect of this provision truly indicates that H.B. 1160 is "simply a small part of an overall
societal trend to shift or reallocate loss among its segments."''
Moreover, by not allowing insurance coverage, Ohio has prevented
punitive damage awards from "penaliz[ing] innocent purchasers of insurance who suffer increased premiums each time a court concludes
that liability insurance provides coverage for such penalties." 62 Theoretically, this position also prevents an insured defendant from making
the argument that punitive damage awards hurt all "innocent purchasers of insurance" through increased premiums. 6 3 Hence, the prohibition against insuring for punitive damages in the context of motor vehicle liability appears to affect both the plaintiff and defendant alike.
2.

Band-Aid or Cure?

Determining whether Ohio has effectively addressed the major
criticisms 64 surrounding punitive damages involves a close examination
of its legislative solutions. The ensuing discussion attempts to assess
whether Ohio's punitive damage reform measures have accomplished
what they were designed to achieve or whether they are simply an imperfect panacea.
To begin, Professor Darling and other proponents of H.B. 1 maintain that the codification of the pre-existing common law requirements
for the recovery of punitive damages was "intended to discourage undue expansion of the punitive damages concept and yet . . . recognize
that a bright-line standard is neither achievable nor desireable [sic] in
light of the penal and deterrent policies underlying punitive damages."' 6 5 Others hoped that this provision would more stringently define
the substantive standards justifying punitive damages and, thereby, remove the uncertainty surrounding the criteria needed to trigger a punitive award. In reality, however, the codification did not effectively narrow the behaviors that warrant the imposition of punitive damages
because all that the reformers achieved was a restatement of the com-

159. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 12.
160. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21 (Anderson Supp. 1988).
161. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 13.
162. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 480. With insurance protection, the defendant can
argue to the jury that he is not hurt by punitive damages and that in reality the only people hurt
are the public in general (including the jury themselves) who must bear the increased insurance
premiums. Prohibiting insurance for punitive damages undermines the logic of this argument.
163. Id.
164. The most common problems associated with punitive damages "include multiple
awards, adverse impact on innocent third parties, constitutionality, lack of deterrent effect, insurability, empassioned jurors, incompatibility with strict liability, impeded investigation of claims,
effect on settlement value and improper windfall." Note, supra note 24, at 251 n.19.
165. S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 118.
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mon law grounds for punitive damages. Essentially, this statutory

framework still leaves Ohio with ambiguous grounds for the recovery of
punitive damages. The problems encountered with regard to the consid-

erable judicial disagreement over what constitutes a showing of malice
is an example of the subjectiveness in the meaning of such legislative
terms. 66
Although H.B. 1 never really gave clear standards for the imposition of punitive damages, in other respects, the statute has successfully
addressed many of the criticisms. That is, while the lack of clear standards does represent a serious failing which should be dealt with by the
legislature, H.B. 1 did carry out the reforms that were needed to make

punitive damages a viable system in Ohio. For example, Professor Darling notes that court determination of the punitive damages award was
"intended to make punitive damages awards more consistent and to

avoid the risk that a jury which hears evidence of a defendant's financial resources [made relevant by a punitive damages claim] will be unduly influenced by that evidence in its resolution of the plaintiff's compensatory damages claim." ' 7 Darling also states that this "change of

tribunal also parallels a criminal prosecution in which the jury determines guilt or innocence and in which the court imposes any
sentence." '68
Upon careful examination, it appears that requiring judicial determination of the amount of punitive damage awards 1 9 promises to be
an effective device to encourage tighter judicial standards and control

excessive verdicts.17 0 This in turn, will "increase the likelihood that pu166. See cases cited supra notes 122, 126-28 and accompanying text. The recent Ohio Supreme Court decision in Preston v. Murty, 32 Ohio St. 3d 334, 512 N.E.2d 1174 (1987), attempted to clarify the requisite malice necessary for the recovery of punitive damages. Id. at
335-36, 512 N.E.2d at 1175-76. For a thorough discussion of the common law recovery of punitive damages, see S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 116-17.
167. S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 118-19. Some states have permitted bifurcation of the
trial "so that compensatory and punitive damages issues are considered separately." Ausness,
supra note 24, at 112. One rationale for this approach is to ensure that potentially inflammatory
evidence be kept from the jury while considering liability and compensatory damages issues. Id.
168. S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 119.
169. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2315.21(B)(2). Connecticut also requires judicial assessment
of punitive damage awards. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-240(b) (West Supp. 1988); see also
UNIFORM PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACT § 120(b), reprinted in 44 Fed. Reg. 62,714 (1979).
170. Apparently, legislative intervention mandating judicial control of punitive damage
award amounts is aimed at excessive awards and their uneven application from jury to jury. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation,
(pt. 3), 36 DEF. L.J. 109, 114-15 (1987). This policy gives great weight to the argument that
judges possess greater strengths and abilities to better evaluate the amount of punitive damages
which should be awarded to the plaintiff and are "less likely to be unduly persuaded by counsel or
influenced by passion or prejudice." Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 664. Professor Darling,
however, cautions that court determination of the punitive damages award amount results in a
"bifurcation of the punitive damages process [and] appears to violate the right to a jury trial
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol14/iss1/13
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nitive damages will be applied in a principled manner. ' 17 1 Thus, by
changing the role of the judge and jury in determining the amount of
punitive damage awards, Ohio lawmakers have successfully responded
to the criticism that punitive damages have been used improperly by
juries to increase the dollar amounts awarded to plaintiffs, even in situations where there is little or no evidence of wanton or malicious behav172
ior on the part of the defendant.
Moreover, judicial assessment and control of the size of individual
awards essentially achieve a result that imposes de facto dollar limits
on punitive damages recovery. This apparently supports the notion that
punitive damages must bear some reasonable relation to the size of the
compensatory award. 173 Finally, the effect of such change achieves the
necessary level of safeguards "to accomplish the public goal of deterrence while at the same time providing fair treatment to both defendants and plaintiffs."' 7 4
As noted earlier, H.B. 1 prohibits the insuring of punitive damages
in motor vehicle liability policies. Through the reenactment of this provision, Ohio legislators have undoubtedly declared that punitive damages were meant to "hurt" the wrongdoer and not "innocent purchasers
of insurance.1 175 The recognition "that insurance negates the objectives
purportedly served by punitive damages"' 76 counteracts criticism directed at the alleged abuses of the punitive damages doctrine. Such
action also serves to neutralize the argument that the doctrine has diverged from its function of both punishment and deterrence.
Finally, Ohio's imposition of a higher standard of proof in punitive
damages cases forestalls the argument that "retribution and protection
of society through deterrence are goals better left to the criminal law
with its attendant procedural safeguards. 1' 77 The effect of a heightened
standard of proof will be to suggest that punitive damage awards

guaranteed by the Ohio Constitution." S. DARLING, supra note 2, at 121.
171. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 664.
172. See, e.g.. Bell & Pearce, Punitive Damages and the Tort System, 22 U. RICH. L. REV.
1,9-11, 17 (1987); Prentice, supra note 70, at 122 n.49; Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 474-75.
173. In theory, however, there is no relationship between punitive damages and the compensatory award. Consequently, in practice, they should not be tied together. That is, if the circumstances warrant an award of punitive damages, then they should not be tied to compensation.
Indeed, the marriage of these two concepts would thwart the aim of punitive damages because
such awards were not intended to reimburse the plaintiff for the amount that he or she was hurt.
Furthermore, punishment would not be significant enough if punitive damages were tied to the
compensatory award. Finally, this interrelationship should not exist because punitive damages
should only express societal outrage that exceeds the compensatory award.
174. See RESOURCE BOOK, supra note 10, at E-1.
175. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 480.
176. Id. at 472.
177.by Note,
supra note
11, at 556.
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and to thwart the

argument that "the burden of proof traditionally used in [punitive
damages] cases is apparently too easy to satisfy.'

79

Such reasoning

supports the premise that punitive damage awards are quasi-criminal in
nature' 80 and, therefore, such awards require that proof be clearly established.181 It should be noted that although some "wrongdoers [may]
go unpunished or undeterred" pursuant to a higher standard, such dis82
advantages do not outweigh the benefits flowing to the defendant.1

Some observers have also claimed that a higher standard of proof
provides greater protection to the defendant when victims of defective
products seek punitive damages.' 83 This protection ensures that only
the guilty are stigmatized.18 4 Other commentators have suggested that
these types of statutory provisions "make punitive damages more difficult to prove. '' 81 In sum, it is possible to conclude from the foregoing
discussion that Ohio's legislative solution affecting punitive damages
has effectively responded to the cry for reform and, thus, avoided
abolishment.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this note has been to describe how Ohio legislators
are attempting to control punitive damages through timely and responsive legislation. At present, the H.B. 1 provisions that modify punitive
damages in Ohio demonstrate that Ohio lawmakers recognize the doctrine has not outlived its usefulness as "a powerful tool . . . [in] controlling conduct."' 86 By rejecting an abolitionist call for the elimination
of punitive damages, Ohio lawmakers have chosen to reformulate the

178. Fletcher, supra note 3, at 12.
179. Johnston, supra note 100, at 1403.
180. Requiring plaintiff to meet a higher standard of proof likens the punitive damages
award to criminal sanctions thereby helping to achieve the public goal of deterrence.
181. Note, supra note 24, at 258 n.67. One author suggests that "[tihe trend toward judicial adoption of the 'clear and convincing' evidence standard seems likely to accelerate, at least in
part as a response to increasing legislative pressure to abolish punitive damages entirely." Johnston, supra note 100, at 1402 n.48.
182. Ausness, supra note 171, at 111; see also Doing Away With Tort Law, supra note 1,
at 660. Some critics assert that the burden of proof for punitive damages is generally too low.
Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 476-77.
183. Sales & Cole, supra note 15, at 476-77. To address the concern that the elimination or
severe limitation of punitive damages would increase the likelihood that corporate manufacturing
safety will be disregarded, Ohio has enacted several new provisions governing the products liability area. Ausness, supra note 24, at 110.
184. Ausness, supra note 171, at 110. The author suggests that a higher standard of proof
ensures a minimum standard of fair treatment for defendants. Id.
185. Id. Professor Sugarman argues that the key to successful tort reform is "the complete
uncoupling of compensation from deterrence." Doing Away With Tort Law, supra note 1, at 664.
186. Mallor & Roberts, supra note 14, at 669-70.
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doctrine by imposing stronger controls. However, it remains to be seen
whether the changes in Ohio punitive damages law "mitigate the negative consequences of punitive damage awards and set clearer guidelines
and standards"1'87 or whether they raise more difficulties than they were
designed to resolve.
Elissa D. Cohen

187. Note, supra note 24, at
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